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The term ‘altruism’ was coined by Auguste Comte in the 1830s, derived from the Latin 
‘alteri huic’ which literally means ‘to this other’. It soon became the centrepiece of an 
ethics stressing our social duties to other people. The term gained particular currency in 
the nineteenth century with the decline of traditional societies in which people’s duties 
were based on their rank or station. With the rise of more impersonal industrial socie-
ties, the question of what obligations people had to others became an issue. However, 
the idea of behaviour which puts the interests of others before oneself was discussed 
by Aristotle, Jesus, Aquinas and many other ethicists before Comte (Scott and Seglow 
2007, Ch. 1). Altruism has fallen out of favour among contemporary moral philosophers 
largely because it has come to be associated with supererogatory (praiseworthy but not 
required) duties, and these have received relatively little attention compared with stricter 
obligations – of social justice for example.1 Altruism remains a concern of evolution-
ary biologists seeking to explain why humans among other selfi sh animals promote the 
interests of others, as well as of social psychologists who similarly explore the nature of 
altruistic motivation (Monroe 1994; Scott and Seglow 2007, Ch. 3, 4).
Economists have long been interested in altruism (Phelps 1975; Collard 1978; Kolm 
1983), though one writer claimed, perhaps unfairly, it’s been a ‘painful nuisance’ for them 
(Lunati 1997, p. 50). Pareto, Edgeworth, Walras and Smith are among those who investi-
gated altruism. Of them, Smith’s treatment is best known. ‘It is not from the benevolence 
of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner’, he famously wrote in 
The Wealth of Nations, ‘but from their regard to their own interest’ (Smith [1776] 1976, 
pp. 26–7). Others spoke of ‘the Adam Smith problem’ (Kolm 1983, p. 22; 2000, p. 16) as 
which concerned how the self-interested assumptions of The Wealth of Nations can be 
squared with the expansion of our empathetic sentiments, as Smith urged in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1759). Recent work has recontextualized Smith, however, resisting 
his recruitment as a public choice theorist before his time. According to Muller, Smith 
believed that commercial society created institutional incentives for people to attain 
virtues that conduced to both their private and the public good. These included prudence, 
self-control, deferred gratifi cation, respect for others and sensitivity to others’ needs 
(Muller 1993). The rising level of material comfort in a market society enables the masses 
to escape their dependence on elites and expand their sympathy and concern for others. 
Human beings have a natural desire to feel emotionally related to others and to identify 
with them (Peil 1999, pp. 83–100). Our desire for approval means we measure our behav-
iour by others’ standards, causing us to strive for wealth and power as things generally 
valued, but at the same time acting as a check on our egoistic tendencies. Altruism, for 
Smith, is motivated above all by our desire to act in a manner that elicits others’ praise 
(Muller 1993, p. 106) – a point to which we shall return.
Before investigating altruism further, we need some defi nitions. Assume that indi-
viduals are self-interested, an axiom of rational choice. The self-interested individual 
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may, however, be perfectly altruistic or perfectly selfi sh, or, as is most likely, somewhere 
between the two. It depends on the source of one’s utility. If I only gain utility through 
seeing you succeed in your goals, then I am perfectly altruistic; if conversely my utility 
is routed only through success in my own goals and preferences, and I am indiff erent to 
yours, then I am selfi sh. Yet in both cases I am self-interested in the sense that I attend 
exclusively to my own utility, whatever the source of it is.2 Most people enjoy utility 
gains through success in their own endeavours but also partly by enjoying the successes 
of others, particularly those close to them. A world of perfect altruists is a logical impos-
sibility, since every last person would be exclusively concerned with others’ preferences, 
leaving no preferences of their own. (Two altruists arguing over who should have the last 
seat on a bus: ‘After you’, ‘No, after you!’)
In its assumption that much overtly altruistic behaviour is powered by more self-
 interested considerations, economics has an affi  nity with socio-biological accounts of 
altruism. On the socio-biological account, altruism is a sacrifi ce of reproductive success 
(‘fi tness’) on the part of the individual in order that at least some members of the group 
enjoy a rise in fi tness (Simon 1993, p. 158). This is a rational choice if the fi tness lost by 
the altruist is less than that gained by the group. Indeed, at the genetic level it is a self-
interested choice insofar as group members share the altruist’s genes. It is possible to 
determine which choices are altruistic, in this technical rendering, and which are on any 
account selfi sh. On this basis, Simon (1993) urged a less a priori and more empirically 
informed economics.
How genuine is altruistic behaviour? Is there a self-interested or other-regarding motive 
to an individual’s benefi ting others? As a behavioural science concerned with observable 
preferences, economics has diffi  culty distinguishing when A’s promotion of B’s welfare is 
actually motivated by A’s altruism from when it is a strategic way of advancing A’s own 
self-interest (Elster 2006). Individuals seek to advance others’ goals not just because they 
care about them, but to boost their own reputation, to achieve social approval (one likes 
to be thought good and indeed needs to be thought so according to Smith), to trigger 
return goods from a strong reciprocator or to avoid punishment if the other is powerful. 
However, if self-interestedly motivated altruistic acts can be put to work in an incentive 
structure geared to the good of all, then it may not matter if they are not genuinely altruis-
tic. In the United States, for example, there is a strong norm of charitable giving amongst 
some of the population; non-givers may experience some shame if givers are motivated 
largely by the desire to avoid shame. Many prohibitions, such as norms against littering 
and other kinds of anti-social behaviour, work in much the same way (Elster 2006, pp. 
194–8). On the other hand, an advocate of the self-interested agent, for the sake of consist-
ency, still needs to take account of every source of well-being, and an individual whose 
altruism is merely behavioural may lose out on sources of well-being that only a genuine 
motivational altruism can provide. As Frey (1997) points out, behavioural (not genuine) 
altruists suff er, fi rst, from impaired self-determination, as they are captive to an incentive 
structure designed by others and do not set their own altruistic ends; second, they do not 
enjoy the heightened self-esteem that comes from having one’s genuine altruism acknowl-
edged by others; and third they are denied the expressive possibility of communicating 
their genuinely altruistic motives to other people. It is fair to say that economics has been 
more interested in the eff ects of altruistic behaviour rather than agents’ motives, whatever 
they are. Frey’s work reminds us there may be costs in doing so.
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Along similar lines, Andreoni, who has written extensively on philanthropy, fears that 
economics may be poorly suited to explaining it – a possibility discussed by others too 
(Andreoni 2006, p. 1205; Sugden 1982). Notwithstanding this, philanthropy is a central 
area in which economists interested in altruistic behaviour have been able to apply their 
theories – sometimes altruism and charity are even equated (Khalil 2004). There are also 
other reasons to examine altruism. In the United States, philanthropic activity amounts 
to about 5 per cent of gross national product.3 Older, better-educated citizens tend to 
give more, and in the United States at least, their preferred recipients have some religious 
affi  liation, amounting to nearly half of all donations. The super-wealthy in the United 
States are usually very generous, but donate less to religiously associated causes. Charities 
operate as competitive market agents, employing ever more sophisticated strategies to 
increase their ‘market share’. Individuals’ giving preferences tend to be interdependent; 
one study found that peer group eff ects are signifi cant insofar as people adjust their giving 
to what is deemed the socially correct amount (Andreoni and Scholz 1998).
In some cases it is not easy to distinguish philanthropic from more market-motivated 
behaviour, for example, where individuals who donate blood or organs are rewarded 
for their gifts through tax breaks, reimbursement for hospitalization and lost time, pay-
ments from their insurance company and so on. Notwithstanding this, organ donation 
(in contrast to standard gifts of time and money) is commonly seen as one of the most 
praiseworthy philanthropic gestures an individual can make (Hamish 1992). Richard 
Titmuss’s classic account of blood donation places value on donors’ trust that their 
fellow citizens would give the same gift in return should the need arise (Titmuss [1970] 
1997). Blood donation helps to bind citizens together as an ethical community in which 
civic solidarity fl ourishes (Page 1996, pp. 94–102). Set against this, Kenneth Arrow com-
plained that the prohibition on selling blood curtails liberty, while the marketization of 
blood alongside a donor system gives individuals a new freedom to sell their blood, while 
retaining their old freedom to donate it (Arrow 1972; compare Singer 1973). Indeed, a 
marketized system existing alongside a donor system means unpaid donors can more 
easily demonstrate their altruism and social virtue by opting for the latter (Machan 
1997, pp. 252–3).
The problem philanthropy poses for altruism arises from the so-called ‘warm glow’ 
eff ect. Individual givers gain much well-being from the activity of giving itself: experi-
encing sympathy, doing what is right and receiving gratitude and recognition in return. 
As charities grow larger, the marginal benefi t of each extra donation is reduced, and the 
warm glow eff ect tends to crowd out other kinds of motivations. Experimental results 
confi rm the importance of the warm glow. In one game, individuals preferred donating 
some fraction of 100 units as a public good over withdrawing from the same number of 
units already publicly committed that fraction they wanted for themselves (Andreoni 
1995). Consistent with this, recent work has theorized the notion of personally making 
a diff erence (Duncan 2004). If the latter is taken seriously as an eff ect, and not just as an 
intention, then donors may cut their contributions (or switch them elsewhere) as their 
marginal eff ect declines. Elster (2006, p. 204) suggests that many charitable endeavours 
are performed for the inner audience. One wants to be able to esteem oneself for a reason; 
individuals do give considerable amounts even when no one else knows of their philan-
thropy (Frey and Meier 2004). Whether self-esteem and the warm glow should count 
in social welfare is a complex question (Andreoni 2006, pp. 1223–30). The same money 
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given may be coercively transferred through the tax system, the standard view being that 
this crowds out philanthropic transfers (Andreoni and Payne 2003).
The family is another area in which altruistically-minded economists have produced 
interesting results. In the well-known Treatise on the Family Becker argues that altruism 
is peculiarly common in families, because they tend to be smaller and contain a denser 
network of interactions than economic enterprises, both of these making other-regarding 
behaviour easier to perform (Becker 1981, p. 299). Marriage ‘markets’ tend to match 
altruistic folk with self-interested spouses who prefer to benefi t from their partner’s 
altruism, creating a stable arrangement where both gain in diff erent ways. (Two altruists 
married to each other would suff er from the ‘after you’ problem, and two people eager 
to benefi t from others’ altruism would enjoy less utility than if they married altruists.) 
Becker’s well-known rotten kid theorem states that if the head of a family is impartially 
concerned with the good of all of its members, and ‘rotten kids’ can augment the family’s 
wealth leaving the head with more to disburse, then they will surely do so. This is a further 
example of simulated altruism (Becker 1974). Stark has conceived of families’ willingness 
to marry out their daughters to wealthy families as a way of buying insurance for them-
selves in their old age (Stark 1995, pp. 13, 8). Further, while on the face of it, it is more 
rational for families in developing countries to send sons rather than daughters abroad 
to lucrative jobs since sons tend to earn more and hence have more income to send back, 
many families prefer to send daughters because girls tend to remit a higher proportion of 
their income and thus in many cases will secure a greater income stream for their parents 
and siblings back home (ibid., pp. 74–7).
If altruistic behaviour, within families, towards charities and elsewhere, augments 
social welfare then it may not matter if many of its motives are less than pure. However, 
as Corts (2006) showed, we cannot always assume that altruism does produce aggregate 
welfare gains. This is chiefl y because altruists encounter coordination problems which 
more self-interested individuals are able to avoid. For example, a husband and wife might 
each sacrifi ce something valuable for themselves – time, money, a valuable possession 
that one might need to sell – in order to buy a present for the other. But if the gift a wife 
presents to her husband is less than the utility she sacrifi ced to procure it, and the same 
holds for her husband’s gift to her, the aggregate social welfare outcome is lower than if 
each had chosen to be selfi sh.4 Corts shows that if several players are only partially altruis-
tic, so that each person’s utility is a part-function of their own success and a part-function 
of at least one other person’s success, then total social welfare may not be optimized.
Pure selfi shness would make the world simpler, if not more pleasant, but the evidence 
is that individuals rarely behave purely selfi shly. A couple of examples from game 
theory illustrate our tendency towards altruistic behaviour. In the one-shot ultimatum 
game, the proposer, in possession of 100 units, makes an off er to share a fraction with 
the respondee which she can either accept or reject. If she rejects it, both get nothing. A 
crude rational choice model would see the respondee accept off ers of just one unit on the 
grounds that anything is better than nothing. In fact, off ers of below 25–30 units tend 
to be rejected, illustrating a strong norm of fairness; respondees feel insulted if off ers 
fall below what they consider just. The ultimatum game has been tested in the United 
States, Germany, Russia, Israel, Japan and among remote tribes in Indonesia and across 
the Pacifi c Islands with fairly consistent results (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Carrerer 2003, 
Ch. 2). Age, ethnicity, gender and other demographic variables also have weak eff ects. 
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The proposer’s off er may or may not be motivated by fairness. In the knowledge that, 
were the proposer in the respondee’s shoes, the norm of fairness would be important, the 
proposer may make a relatively generous off er for purely strategic reasons (Elster 2006, 
p. 189). In the dictator game, by contrast, recipients are powerless; proposers simply 
choose which off er to make. The fi rst time this was tested, three-quarters of proposers 
chose to split $20 equally between themselves and the recipient; and only one-quarter 
elected to keep $18, handing over just $2 (Kahneman et al. 1986). However, in subse-
quent experiments when dictators could choose precisely what fraction to share, off ers 
were less generous. In one game where dictators disbursed money to actual welfare 
recipients, those recipients who were seen to have a stronger preferences for working 
were off ered more (Fong 2007).
Two parties each prepared to give to the other often enter mutually reciprocal benefi cial 
relationships. Closely related to altruism, reciprocity diff ers in that it is bi-directional, A 
gives to B and B gives to A. Reciprocity is also distinguished from exchange, which shares 
its bi-directionality. With exchange, however, exemplifi ed in the economic market, giving 
is conditional on receiving something in return at the same time; with reciprocity there 
is merely the expectation that this will be forthcoming (Kolm 2006, p. 25). Why should 
individuals expect this? Individuals may reciprocate because they like the giver, because 
they self-interestedly want the giving to continue, out of gratitude towards the giver or a 
desire to retain the ‘moral balance’ and not be indebted, as well as considerations of fair-
ness. That last motive is useful in explaining schemes of ‘generalized reciprocity’ when the 
individual from whom givers enjoy a return may not be the same as the person to whom 
they gave. Reciprocity usually serves social integration, but generalized reciprocity means 
a degree of solidarity can be maintained over far larger numbers of people. When prac-
tices of reciprocity benefi t all, and individuals are prepared to maintain them, the result 
can be a stable economic society of mutual benefi t. Perhaps because of this, reciprocity 
is endemic to human society. Marcel Mauss’s classic of comparative anthropology The 
Gift (1924), argues that, contrary to what anthropologists such as Malinowski believed, 
human history shows there are no unreciprocated gifts; giving always establishes an 
expectation of return (Mauss [1924] 2002). Mauss’s thesis that (reciprocal) gifts in ritual-
ized settings promote social integration provides insights for today’s thinking about gift 
economies (as opposed to market economies). But the claim that there are no free gifts is 
a radical and hardly plausible one (how could there then be altruism?), and it is certainly 
not entailed by the truth that reciprocity is endemic.
Strong reciprocity tends to occur when individuals share and cooperate, and in 
addition are liable to punish, even at some personal cost, free-riders and others who 
violate cooperative norms (Bowles and Gintis 2004). Strong reciprocity stabilizes other-
 regarding norms without recourse to hierarchical authority, but unfortunately it cannot 
always be guaranteed. Some of the most intractable problems in the economics of altru-
ism occur when it is so essential that individuals get their due that practices of reciprocity 
are institutionalized and backed by coercive sanctions as in the tax-funded welfare state. 
One could argue, as noted above, that any kind of genuine altruism is crowded out here 
(Seglow 2002), though Harris (1987) maintains that, though forced to give, taxpayers still 
have the choice of whether to give altruistically. The evidence shows that individuals will 
accept sanctions on defaults from altruism if those sanctions are perceived as fair (Fehr 
and Rockenbach 2003). The diffi  culty then becomes how to harness this sense of fairness 
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to the forced nature of tax-giving, especially given that many citizens believe that welfare 
subsidizes those who in reality have little claim on our giving (Gilens 1999).
Notes
1. Monroe’s (1996) moral-psychological notion of a common humanity is an important exception to this 
trend.
2. What economics has diffi  culty explaining is persons who care about others’ welfare exclusively for the sake 
of the other, without reference to their own utility at all.
3. In most European states, private philanthropic activity is far less, but public transfers are correspondingly 
higher.
4. Of course, we would need to factor into this the utility that comes from giving itself.
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